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This research examines the degree to which legislators respond to their
districts by analyzing immigration-related legislative speeches from
the Swedish parliament (2005-2016). Using a text-scaling method, we
find that the immigration discourse fluctuates between ‘socio-economic
responsibility’ and ‘cultural difference’ poles. We argue that socio-
economic declines and extreme-right party success serve as an indi-
cation to MPs that there is demand for ‘cultural difference’ rhetoric
on immigration. Our statistical analyses support the argument and
demonstrate that district-level economic declines can lead to an in-
crease in the salience of cultural framing of migrants, especially in
districts with a higher share of foreign residents. We also find that
district-level extreme-right electoral success has a significant influence
on legislative immigration discourse. Overall, the results have impli-
cations for studies of legislative texts, dyadic representation, and the
impact of the populist right on legislative politics in Europe.
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Introduction
Politicians don’t often cry in public. And yet, in November 2015, the
Swedish deputy Prime Minister, heading a pro-immigration governing coali-
tion, broke into tears as she was describing new, restrictive immigration
policies. She then rationalized this policy U-turn by claiming it was a nec-
essary step to respond to the difficulties members of her party were facing
at the local level. To us, this memorable press conference demonstrates the
degree to which legislators are always required to respond to the informa-
tion reported from their constituencies. This responsiveness is especially
important during periods of systemic shocks such as the immigration crisis
faced by European countries over the last few years. These periods pro-
vide a favourable political opportunity structure for political entrepreneurs
(Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kitschelt, 1986), who try to use crises to re-
shape the political agenda to their advantage. In these cases, mainstream
politicians use available information regarding social, economic and electoral
conditions to make costly decisions as to which issues to address and what
positions to take on these issues (Borghetto and Russo, 2018; Klüver and
Sagarzazu, 2015).
But what factors affect the ability of mainstream politicians to respond
to voters’ preferences? And what information do they rely on to learn
about those preferences? Previous studies have pointed to aspects such as
past electoral results, economic conditions, government participation, main-
stream/niche status, party size, family and ideological positioning relative
to newcomers and promoters of new issues (Adams et al., 2004; Adams and
Somer-Topcu, 2009; Greene, 2016; Green-Pedersen, 2007). While there is
evidence of parties responding to voter preferences on the national party
level, we know less about the responsiveness that exists at the district-level.
Most studies approach the topic of responsiveness by analyzing election
manifestos or party press releases. This modeling approach is lacking on
two fronts. First, by focusing on election campaigns, the research neglects
the dynamic during the life of the legislature. Second, analysis of party
documents does not take into account divergences across legislators. How-
ever, since legislators take into account district-level factors as they decide
whether and how to address an issue or a political newcomer, we believe it
is essential to incorporate these factors into the analysis.
The approach taken here is therefore to analyse the MP-district nexus. We
focus on responsiveness in the context of immigration politics. Beyond its
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current impact on global and national politics, we believe immigration is of
utter importance to broad theoretical debates in the study of party strategy
and responsiveness. Firstly, the issue is challenging for political elites, since
it does not map well onto established ideological dimensions, and may lead to
party factionalism, splits, and party-system realignments (Benoit and Laver,
2007; Bornschier, 2010b; Kriesi et al., 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup,
2008). Secondly, the magnitude of migration waves provides an improved
political opportunity structure for political entrepreneurs (Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006; Kitschelt, 1986). Thirdly, as Van Der Brug and Van Spanje
(2009) argue, there is a demand for parties expressing cultural (immigration-
related) positions, coupled with economic left-wing positions (Mudde, 2007),
and therefore the immigration issue can have a profound impact on the
future configuration of party competition.
The concept of demand for culturally based positions on immigration is cen-
tral to our thesis. Given that there is cross-district variation in this demand,
we conceptualize responsiveness as a process by which electorally oriented
MPs use socio-economic, demographic, and electoral district information as
cues about the level of this demand. If the district demand is high, MPs
will respond by focusing more on the cultural aspects of immigration, at the
expense of discussing the economic aspects of it.
We derive this approach from two strands of the literature on the structure
of party competition in Europe. First, country-specific and comparative
studies on political dimensionality and competition report a shift from a uni-
dimensional left-right structure towards a multi-dimensional/issue-oriented
configuration, in which, over time, the overall salience of social issues is
increasing (Green-Pedersen, 2007; König et al., 2017; Prosser, 2016; van
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008). Second, literature dealing with immigra-
tion positions finds that, while mainstream parties’ positions on immigration
can be mainly predicted by their position on the economic left-right scale,
citizens’ positions on the issue are actually more related to a cultural di-
mension (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009).
Thus, under certain conditions, MPs are expected to respond to the demand
by addressing the cultural aspects of immigration.
But what factors predict these type of responsiveness, by which legisla-
tors shift from an emphasis on the economic aspects of immigration to its
cultural aspects? Economic and social declines have been shown to lead to
increased support for right-wing parties (Betz, 1993; Hagelund, 2003; Hobolt
and Tilley, 2016), as well as to negative attitudes towards globalization, the
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EU, and immigration (Clarke et al., 2017; Haidt, 2016; Burscher et al., 2015;
Dinas and van Spanje, 2011). Therefore, we expect MPs representing dis-
tricts that have experienced such declines to shift toward culturally oriented
rhetoric. However, we believe that the relationship between socio-economic
deterioration and shifts towards this type of discourse is conditional on two
important factors. First, much like Hobolt and Vries (2015) and Spanje
(2010), who study how government status affects responsiveness, we ex-
pect opposition MPs to be more responsive. Second, we expect a stronger
relationship between socio-economic deterioration at the district level and
MPs’ responsiveness in districts that are characterized by a higher share
of foreign-born residents (see, for example, Golder, 2003). Third, we be-
lieve the electoral threats posed by extreme right parties (ERPs) matters.
Studies of party positions and issue attention (Adams and Somer-Topcu,
2009; Meguid, 2005; Spoon et al., 2013) have found that electoral threat
is likely to affect both party positioning overall, as well as in the specific
case of ERPs and immigration (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Bale, 2003; Dahlstrom
and Sundell, 2012; Spanje, 2010). Thus, we expect district-level success of
ERPs to predict responsiveness, that is, a shift of mainstream MPs from the
district towards a cultural immigration discourse.
To test these hypotheses, we derive estimates of MPs’ position on immi-
gration, using Slapin and Proksch’s (2008) wordfish model. We scale 5199
immigration legislative speeches given in the Swedish Riksdag during the
2005-2016 period. We find that speeches can best be ordered on a scale
ranging between two extremes, the first being a ‘socio-economic responsi-
bility’ pole, and the second a ‘cultural difference’ pole. This scale echoes
frames identified in other European countries (Hagelund, 2003; van Kers-
bergen and Krouwel, 2008; Van-Heerden et al., 2014). We then leverage a
battery of social, economic and electoral variables, as well as institutional
and MP-level variables to predict MPs’ immigration positions and rhetorical
responsiveness.
Our statistical analyses provide a number of important results. First, we
find robust evidence that changes in the economy have an impact on legisla-
tive rhetoric. Specifically, economic declines predict responsiveness, that is,
shifts towards a cultural difference discourse. When we explore the factors
that condition this type of responsiveness, we find mixed results. Contrary
to our expectation, we find only weak evidence regarding the difference be-
tween government and opposition MPs. However, when it comes to the
ethnic composition of the district, we find that the responsiveness of MPs
is stronger as the share of foreign-born residents in the district increases.
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Finally, we find that district-level ERP success also predicts a shift towards
cultural difference discourse.
The results have a number of important implications. First, they provide
additional evidence of the growing importance of issue politics in Europe,
and especially of the increased salience of cultural politics (Green-Pedersen,
2007; König et al., 2017; van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008). We believe
that our empirical findings, which echo the theoretical literature on the de-
mand for culturally oriented politics among the working class (Hooghe and
Marks, 2018; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009), are helpful in under-
standing some of the new political discourses and alliances in European poli-
tics. Second, the fact that responsiveness among legislators is conditional on
the ethnic composition of the district may have useful policy implications.
Finally, the fact that ERPs’ electoral success affects political language is
especially important. Mudde (2013) has argued that the influence of ERPs
on the issue of immigration is limited, but here we show that ERPs are
influential, since mainstream MPs use their success to gauge the demand
for culturally oriented politics. More broadly, ERPs are changing the way
in which mainstream politicians discuss immigration. Indeed, this research
provides evidence that even when ERPs do not win the electoral race, their
electoral threat has an impact on the political discourse in Europe.
District-level Responsiveness on Immigration: How
the local and institutional interact
Why do legislators speak in parliament? We follow the literature arguing
that politicians use their time on the floor for credit claiming, or as a means
of highlighting MPs’ positions to voters and other political actors (Herzog
and Benoit, 2015; Maltzman and Sigelman, 1996; Martin and Vanberg, 2007;
Mayhew, 1974; Proksch and Slapin, 2010). Among other things, MPs use
their speeches to signal their constituencies that their position is responsive
to the needs of the district. This signaling behavior involves a process by
which the MP observes the relevant conditions in her district. Based on this
information, she decides whether to address an issue, and in what way.
This type of dyadic representation has been studied most thoroughly in the
candidate-centered system of the United States (Ansolabehere et al., 2001;
Krimmel et al., 2016), and recently in the UK (Hanretty et al., 2016). But
in strong party systems such as the Swedish, some research suggests that
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district-level congruence is manifested via MPs’ parliamentary questions,
speeches, and bill cosponsorship (Baumann et al., 2015; Fernandes et al.,
2017). Further, the Swedish open-list PR system should encourage some
level of personal vote-seeking (Carey and Shugart, 1995) and dyadic repre-
sentation. Studies of the Swedish system support this expectation by high-
lighting the pressure local party activists exert on MPs (Butler et al., 2016),
and the fact that MPs report district-level representation to be important
(Gilljam and Brothen, 1994).
There is vast literature demonstrating that parties use information on voting
intentions and voters’ preferences to adjust their positions (Adams et al.,
2008, 2004; Somer-Topcu, 2009). Another strand of the literature shows
that parties modify their attention based on changes in voters’ issues salience
(Borghetto and Russo, 2018; Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2015; Klüver and Spoon,
2016), and that their ability to adjust is conditional on institutional variables
such as government status (Heck, 2016; Spanje, 2010). Another set of works
address electoral challenges, and parties’ response to shifts in the positions of
rival parties or niche party entry (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Meguid, 2005; Adams
and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Spoon et al., 2013).
Our research builds on this literature but goes beyond the party as a unified
actor approach. Specifically, we analyze the degree to which MPs, rather
than parties, respond to district constituencies (Hanretty et al., 2016; An-
solabehere et al., 2001; Krimmel et al., 2016). Similar to Herzog and Benoit
(2015), who analyse legislators’ rhetoric and correspondence with district
conditions, we test whether district-level socio-economic changes correlate
with MPs’ language. Our first expectation is that MPs elected in districts
where there has been socio-economic deterioration will emphasize the cul-
tural aspects of immigration in their speeches, rather than its economic
aspects.
The first reason for this expectation has to do with changes in the structure
of party competition in Europe. An important line of research has identi-
fied an emerging, cross-cutting, cultural conflict. This conflict is structured
around European integration, nationalism, identity, and anti-immigration
(Bornschier, 2010a; Hoeglinger, 2016; Hooghe et al., 2002; Hooghe and Marks,
2009). Moreover, this conflict pits the economic losers of processes of inte-
gration and globalization against the winners (Kriesi et al., 2006). Recently,
Hooghe and Marks (2018) go as far as arguing that the migration crisis has
led to a new, transnational cleavage, in which losers of globalisation pro-
cesses find refuge in increased nationalism. In addition, research points to a
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relationship between socio-economic hardships and opposition to globaliza-
tion, European integration, and migration, perceived as a threat to national
culture and tradition (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Clarke et al., 2017; Haidt,
2016).
Issue competition (Carmines and Stimson, 1990) has also become increas-
ingly relevant in European politics, both overall and in the case of immigra-
tion (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). Indeed,
in the Netherlands, de Vries et al. (2013) find that attitudes toward immigra-
tion are more predictive of voters’ left-right placement than their attitudes
towards economic distribution. In addition to the increasing importance
of non-economic issues, parties’ positions are more congruent with those of
citizens on socio-economic issues than on cultural issues such as immigra-
tion (Dalton, 2015; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009). As Dalton and
McAllister (2014) note, parties’ positions are ‘sticky’ and thus it may take
time until they respond to voters’ preferences.
As cultural politics becomes more salient, and the lack of congruence be-
tween parties and voters becomes apparent, mainstream parties face a dilemma.
On the one hand, they may benefit from an electoral landscape character-
ized by economic issues, which they own, rather than increase the salience of
other issues (Norris, 2005; Meguid, 2005). On the other hand, parties may
want to take advantage of the opportunity if there is sufficient demand for
culturally oriented politics (Schumacher and Kersbergen, 2014). District-
level variation in socio-economic conditions may help parties to solve this
dilemma. Specifically, district-level economic deterioration signals to politi-
cians that there is demand for culturally oriented discourse. This leads to
the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: (The responsiveness hypothesis): District-level socio-economic
deterioration predicts responsiveness, that is, a shift toward culturally ori-
ented rhetoric.
However, MPs’ response to this demand is conditional on a number of fac-
tors. First, governing parties can only devote limited attention to new issues,
because they are constrained by political events, policy-making, and main-
taining a coherent policy agenda. Opposition parties are less constrained and
are therefore expected to shift their attention to external issues (Klüver and
Spoon, 2016; Williams and Spoon, 2015). Beyond government constraint,
the opposition, who are the losers in the current state of affairs, have an
incentive to reshape the structure of the debate by changing the issues on
the agenda (Carmines and Stimson, 1990; Riker, 1986; Tzelgov, 2012). Van-
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Spanje (2010) and Hobolt and Vries (2015) have used similar reasoning to
explain why opposition parties are more likely than governing ones to take
on anti-immigration positions in response to ERPs success. This leads to
the following expectation:
Hypothesis 1a: (The opposition hypothesis): The relationship between district-
level socio-economic deterioration and responsiveness is conditional on government-
opposition status. Specifically, the marginal effect of socio-economic deteri-
oration is stronger for opposition MPs than for government MPs.
While we expect socio-economic deterioration to increase the demand for
cultural rhetoric on immigration, we also hypothesize that the relationship
between this deterioration and rhetoric is conditional on the demographic
composition of the district. This expectation mirrors studies focusing on ‘lo-
cals’ seeing newcomers as competitors over scarce resources, in aspects such
as labour, housing, and welfare benefits (Fennema, 2005). For example, a
comparative study by Golder (2003) has found that unemployment moder-
ates the effect of immigration on ERP support, but in the Swedish context,
Rydgren and Ruth (2011) and Rydgren and Ruth (2013) find mixed results.
Following this literature, we specify the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: (The demography hypothesis) : The relationship between
district-level socio-economic deterioration and responsiveness is conditional
on the ethnic composition of the district. Specifically, the marginal effect of
socio-economic deterioration is stronger in districts in which the share of
foreign-born residents is increasing.
Electoral threat and Responsiveness
The increasing rates of migration into Sweden have been accompanied by
a steady increase in the electoral appeal of the Swedish ERP, the Sweden
Democrats. The Swedish ERP poses a threat to both right and left-wing
parties (Odmalm, 2011; Oskarson and Demker, 2015). But how would an
electoral threat affect legislative rhetoric? The spatial theory of party com-
petition connects electoral threats to spatial movements (Enelow and Hinich,
1984). Parties have been found to modify their positions in response to
past election results (Somer-Topcu, 2009), changes in public opinion (Adams
et al., 2004), and due to an electoral threat by niche parties (Meguid, 2005).
In addition, studies of ‘contagion effects’ have found that ERPs’ success
leads mainstream politicians to adopt restrictive immigration positions and
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welfare chauvinist frames (Dahlstrom and Sundell, 2012; Schumacher and
Kersbergen, 2014; Van-Spanje, 2010). Viewed through the theoretical frame-
work of responsiveness, we conceive mainstream parties as using past ERP
electoral success to gauge the demand for cultural rhetoric on immigration,
which is a dominant feature of ERPs (Hagelund, 2003; van Kersbergen and
Krouwel, 2008; Van-Heerden et al., 2014).




To prepare the rhetorical data, we have downloaded all of the floor de-
bates during the 2005-2016 period from the Riksdag’s website. We then
used python scripts to produce a dictionary containing the most frequent
7,000 Swedish stems.1 Following previous work analysing legislative speeches
(Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016; Lucas et al., 2015; Proksch and Slapin, 2009),
we removed stop words, numbers and legislator names.2
We have identified immigration debates using an iterative process. Initially,
we constructed a dictionary of immigration-related words. We then used
the dictionary to automatically search through the headings of the 20,814
debates. Once a round of automated search ended, we examined all the
headings and read a sample of the debates identified as relevant, and subse-
quently dropped cases that were erroneously classified. Second, after reading
the headings of debates that were left out of the immigration corpus, we have
used words from the headings of these debates to refine the dictionary and
rerun the automated search, until we found no debates that were left out or
needed to be omitted.3
1Stemming was done using python’s NLTK snowball stemmer, and by the SnowballC
R package.
2Substantive results are not sensitive to the removal of these features.
3See the supporting material for a detailed discussion.
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Model Interpretation
We have used Slapin and Proksch’s (2008) algorithm to estimate MPs ex-
pressed positions on immigration.4 To calibrate the estimates across parties
and time, we omitted terms that have not been used both pre and post the
2015 immigration crisis. We also limited our vocabulary to words that MPs
from all parties have used. As a result, our document-term matrix includes
5199 speeches and 588 unique stems.5
We are interested in two parameters estimated by the model. The first is
the (word-specific) β parameter, which reports how informative a word is in
discriminating across the positions of speeches. Second, we are interested
in the (speech-specific) ω parameter, which is an estimate of the position of
the speech in the latent space. Table 1 presents the scaling model’s output
in terms of discriminatory words (large absolute values of the β parameter).
Most words in the left column refer to social and economic issues facing
immigrants, as well as to the responsibility of the Swedish authorities both
at the national and municipal level. We also note that a number of words
point to the hardships experienced by immigrants. In the right column,
most words are characteristic of cultural differences between immigrants
and locals, and to inter-group conflict. Overall, these two extremes echo
frames of reference identified in the literature on the immigration discourse
in Western Europe (Hagelund, 2003; Rydgren, 2008; van Kersbergen and
Krouwel, 2008; Minkenberg, 2001; Van-Heerden et al., 2014).
Based on the words identified as discriminatory by the statistical model
and our reading of hundreds of speeches, we conclude that one pole of the
immigration rhetoric highlights ‘socio-economic responsibility ’ towards im-
migrants. As an example, consider the following speech, made on April 2015
by Yilmaz Kerimo, a Social Democrat MP:“ Of course, there is no need to
review the entire refugee reception and EBO [a law allowing refugees to set-
tle where they wish in Sweden]... On the other hand, the regulations can be
revised with regards to how we can encourage other municipalities to receive
refugees so that the reception process will be characterized by solidarity. We
can also reduce the prejudices that exist for better and easier integration
4For other implementations using legislative speeches, see Baumann et al. (2015);
Proksch and Slapin (2010); Slapin and Proksch (2008).
5The median length is 61 words, and the mean 89. The shortest speech has 20 words
and the longest 930. The standard deviation is 81.6. We estimated the model using these
speeches as (unaggregated) input, using the austin package in R 3.3.2.
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Table 1: 25 characteristic words: Socio-Economic Responsibility
and Cultural Difference Poles
Low β High β
municipality hate crime
























Note: Discriminatory words obtained from Slapin and Proksch’s (2008) scaling model.
where there are jobs and housing in other municipalities.” Another speech,
made by Nyamki Sabuni on April 2010 exemplifies the socio-economic re-
sponsibility pole:“I think that all those [municipalities] who receive refugees
need extra resources if these children are able to manage their schooling
... I do not want a compensation scheme for only some municipalities ...
[W]hat I mean is the future should be considered when we discuss solidarity
in reception.”
The other pole of the immigration debate emphasizes ‘cultural difference’ as
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well as friction between immigrants and other communities in Sweden. For
example, on May 2011, Björn Söder, of the Sweden Democrats, said:“It is
often said that intolerance has increased among school students in Sweden.
For example, students are asked whether they think immigration is good for
the Swedish economy. If they answer ‘no’ to this question, it contributes to
a higher intolerance score in the report. Does the Prime Minister see a risk
when work against xenophobia, such as this survey, paints any critique of
migration policies as racism? And why is there no mention of the extensive
“hostility towards Swedes” in the investigative directive?” Similarly, Johan
Linander (Centre party), said on January 2011:“Just as Muslims are in need
to combat violent Islamism, the Sweden Democrats have a responsibility to
do what they can to counter high-extremist or Islamophobic forces who listen
to their message about Muslims.”6
We emphasize that these two poles do not correspond to pro- and anti-
immigrant attitudes,7 but are indicative of the rhetorical frames chosen by
MPs as they address the immigration issue. Thus, it is entirely possible
for an MP to hold pro-immigration views and yet discuss cultural difference
issues. Conversely, there are instances in which anti-immigrant MPs discuss
the degree to which Sweden is responsible for migrants.
Validation
We now turn to a quantitative examination of characteristic speeches, that
is, those that have high absolute values of the ω parameter. First, in Figure
1, we present the distribution of median MP positions by party. Two things
emerge from the figure. First, MPs across all parties —with the exception
of the Sweden Democrats —express positions across the entire range of the
scale.8 This echoes Widfeldt’s (2015) argument, that one would be hard-
pressed to find differences between parties on immigration. Second, the
median position for the Sweden Democrats (sd in the figure) is the most
cultural difference oriented, and the distribution is truncated from below,
indicating that these MPs rarely engage in ‘socio-economic responsibility’
6For brevity, only excerpts are quoted. Authors’ translation.
7Ruedin and Morales (2017) criticize the use of wordfish in the context of parties’ immi-
gration position(analyzing manifestos). However, our findings indicate that the wordfish
scaling technique is useful in identifying frames of references, rather than anti/pro posi-
tions. Speeches demonstrating this point can be found in the supplemental material.
8The distribution of KD, the Christian Democratic party, is different because the party
emphasizes differences between Christian and Muslim immigrants.
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oriented rhetoric. This reflects its emphasis of Swedish nationalism and
nativism (Hellstrom et al., 2012).9



















Legislators' positions on immigration by party
Note: Distributions of parties’ expressed positions on immigration. Estimates are aggregated to
the MP-median level. Higher values indicate a more cultural difference position. Lower values
indicate socio-economic responsibility positions.
We also validate the scale by comparing it to estimates from a structural
topic model (STM) (Roberts et al., 2018). The STM offers a framework
to estimate the topic of each document (speech). Within this framework,
each topic is conceived to be a mixture over words and each word has a
probability of belonging to a topic. Below we present the results of a ten
topic model, which was selected based on its log-likelihood (Griffiths and
Steyvers, 2004) and perplexity (Cao et al., 2009).
Table 2 presents the characteristic words of the topics (labels in bold).10
The table reveals that some topics identified by the STM model are closely
9See supporting material for additional validation.
10These words have a high lift parameter (Taddy, 2013), which is the frequency of a
word in a given topic divided by its frequency in other topics.
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Table 2: characteristic words from a ten topic structural topic model
Identity Reception Economy Legality Education
hate crime unaccompanied youth woman rejection SFI (Swedish for immigrants)
racism refugee children research Iraq integration policy
religion living budget court teaching
ethnic municipality Kronor Iraqi education
Muslim refugee reception beneficial migration secretary national audit office
Sweden Democrats receive tax expulsion migration
democratic place power reject establishment
Labour International Security Debates Children
worker escape extremism criticize child
employer EU terrorism head identity
labour force Europe scrutiny listen citizenship
use fleeing declare taken family
abuse period organization interesting term
labour migration European against discussion wise
condition together coordination nothing kid
related to the poles estimated by the wordfish model. Thus, for example,
words such as hate crime, racism, and religion appear as having high dis-
criminatory value according to the wordfish model and as being indicative
of a topic we label identity. Similarly, words such as unaccompanied youth,
municipality and reception are informative according to the wordfish model
and are indicative of an STM topic we have labelled reception. Further ex-
amination reveals a number of STM topics characterized by words that the
wordfish model has also identified as informative.
Given that the STM has identified similar sets of words as the wordfish
model, we move to compare the topics. Specifically, we examine the de-
gree to which the wordfish scale estimates correspond to the relevant topic
probabilities from the STM algorithm. We should expect strong positive
correlations between our scale and the STM identity and security topics,
and negative correlations with the reception and economy topics. In Fig-
ure 2 we present the relevant correlations, which support our expectations.
Six STM topics have substantively significant correlations with the wordfish
scale. As expected, identity and security topics are aligned with the word-
fish scale. We also note that the legality topic (dealing with the possible
deportation of migrants) is highly correlated with the scale. In addition,
there are significant negative correlations between the wordfish scale and
socio-economic responsibility aspects captured in STM model in topics such
as reception, economy and education.
Overall, these findings lend support to the validity of our scale. Even though
the wordfish algorithm and the STM are different in terms of the modeling
assumptions and outputs (a unidimensional space in the wordfish model and
a mixture of topics in the STM), they point to a similar characterization of
the immigration discourse in parliament.
15
Figure 2: Wordfish and structural topic model correlations
























































































































































Note: Correlations of the wordfish model ω parameter with the log of the θ (the proportion
of each speech that is allocated to a specific topic) STM parameter. The topics presented were
selected in a stepwise regression model, regressing the wordfish ω parameter on speeches’ topic
probabilities. Correlations of the four other topics with the criterion are below 0.05.
Findings
In order to test the relationships between district-level characteristics and
MPs’ rhetoric, we collected measures of welfare recipients, unemployment,
median income, crime (violent crime per 100,000 inhabitants) and percent-
age of district residents holding no post primary education. The statistical
models also include a variable capturing the cost of refugee reception per
capita, and the share of the district’s residents that are foreign-born.11
We incorporate a number of variables that capture political institutions and
MPs’ personal characteristics. Based on literature indicating that women
have different attitudes towards immigration than men (Blinder, 2015), as
11Descriptive statistics and data sources can be found in the supporting material.
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well as party-specific scholarship reporting that parties with a higher share
of women legislators present more social justice policies (Kittilson, 2011), we
include a gender variable. Second, we build upon the literature on descrip-
tive representation (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012), and include an indicator
variable for MPs born outside of Sweden. The third individual level vari-
able captures ministerial roles, because ministers’ speeches may represent
the position of the ministry/government rather than their own opinion or
district. We also use binary variables to account for government/opposition
status, and a dummy variable indicating whether in a given debate there
are severe restrictions in place on speakers (See also Bäck et al. (2014)).12
We also include a binary variable coded one for speeches given after the
immigration crisis (November 2015), and zero before. Finally, all models
include party indicator variables (estimates not reported).
Since we are interested in the degree to which changes in districts’ socio-
demographic conditions predict responsiveness, we use yearly changes in lev-
els of welfare recipients, unemployment, median income, and violent crime,
as well as in the cost of refugees per capita and the share of district resi-
dents that are foreign-born. Due to moderately-high correlations between
three of our variables, in some of the models, we also use a variable that
captures overall economic change and is based on the scores obtained from a
principal component analysis (PCA) on unemployment, welfare recipients,
and median income.13
Importantly, we do not claim to have identified the exact causal pathway be-
tween district characteristics and speeches. Our approach is to use a number
of estimation techniques to ensure that the results are robust to modeling
choices. We present results from district fixed effects models, which take
into account the potentially biasing effects of unmeasured stable variables.
In these models, we cluster the standard errors by district. Second, we
use mixed models with district-level intercepts (Gelman and Hill, 2016), in
which we estimate district-level random intercepts. These models are useful
since if there is not a lot of reliable district-level variation, estimates are
12The general rule is freedom of speech (Riksdagsordningen 6 kap. 15). However, the
speaker (after consulting with parties’ leaders) can impose restrictions on the debates. In
practice, this rule only affects Current Debates (Aktuell debatt) in which the convention
is to limit the number of speakers to one per party, giving the leadership extensive power
over who speaks.
13The correlations range between 0.54-0.71. We use the principal() function from
the psych R package, employing varimax rotation. See the supporting material for a
correlation matrix.
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pooled toward the overall district grand mean.
We begin by testing the responsiveness hypothesis, which states that socio-
economic deterioration predicts cultural difference rhetoric. Figure 3 presents
the first set of models, including coefficients on five variables of interest.
These are the overall change in the district’s economy, changes in the share
of welfare recipients, median income, unemployment, and crime.14 We es-
timate both fixed effects and random effects models and incorporate con-
trols for education and institutional factors. The results presented in the
figure are highly stable across all models. Beginning with potential con-
founders, the positive and significant coefficients indicate that in central-
ized debates the rhetoric is much more oriented towards cultural difference
rhetoric. While we do not delve into this result, the magnitude of the rela-
tionship is indicative of the importance of legislative selection mechanisms
on the type of rhetoric employed in the debate. Conversely, we do not find
a relationship between government membership and rhetoric.
Moving to district level variables, the models indicate a significant relation-
ship between the economic variables and rhetoric. Specifically, besides the
fixed effects model with ∆ welfare recipients (panel B), in which we cannot
reject the null, we find that socio-economic deterioration, captured by any
of the relevant variables, is indeed predictive of cultural difference rhetoric.
Counter-intuitively, some of the results indicate that a higher proportion
of residents holding only primary education is predictive of socio-economic
responsibility rhetoric.15 Finally, the models do not indicate that changes
in the cost of refugees and in the share of foreign-born district residents to
be predictive of rhetoric.
In Figure 4 we present augmented models, including three individual MP
level variables, as well as a crisis-period indicator variable.16 Again, the
results are stable across all model specifications. Male legislators are more
difference oriented than females, while speeches of MPs who were born out-
side of Sweden are significantly more socio-economic responsibility oriented.
One model (panel C) points to a marginally significant relationship between
the crisis period and rhetoric, but we do not take these to indicate a sub-
stantively important result given the null findings in all other model spec-
ifications. Importantly, the results in all models provide support for the
14See Table 1, supporting material.
15We note that Arzheimer and Carter (2006) report a similar result, and leave this for
future research.
16See Table 2, supporting material.
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Figure 3: Socio-economic district conditions, institutions and immigration
rhetoric
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Note: Models predicting the β parameter from the scaling model. Positive coefficients indicate
that the variable predicts cultural difference discourse. Negative coefficients indicate that the
variable predicts socio-economic responsibility discourse. Symbols indicate point estimates and
horizontal lines are 90% confidence intervals. All district level variables have been normalized.
responsiveness hypothesis. Concretely, we find that across all of the spe-
cific economic indicators, as well as the composite district economy vari-
able, worse conditions are predictive of more culturally oriented rhetoric.
In addition, violent crime is found to be predictive of difference rhetoric.
While the magnitude of the effects is not large (one standard deviation in
these normalized variables corresponds to 0.04-0.07 change in the dependent
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variable), they are robust and consistent with the theoretical expectation.
Figure 4: district economy, institutions, MP level variables, crisis, and im-
migration rhetoric
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Note: Models predicting the β parameter from the scaling model. Positive coefficients indicate
that the variable predicts cultural difference discourse. Negative coefficients indicate that the
variable predicts socio-economic responsibility discourse. Symbols indicate point estimates and
horizontal lines are 90% confidence intervals. All district level variables have been normalized.
We now examine the opposition hypothesis, stating that responsiveness
should be higher for opposition parties. Figure 5 presents the marginal
effect of the socio-economic variables, conditional on government status.17
The results indicate that opposition MPs are more responsive than MPs
17See Table 3, supporting material.
20
from government parties, but only when we examine overall economic con-
ditions or change in the share of welfare recipients (Panel A). In the case
of the overall index of district economy, the marginal effect for government
MPs is indistinguishable from zero, while that of opposition MPs is sig-
nificant and positive, as hypothesized. The effect is similar in the case of
∆ welfare recipients.18 Overall, a one standard deviation increase in these
standardized variables corresponds a 0.07-0.1 shift towards the difference
pole. However, in the models interacting yearly changes in median income
and unemployment with governing status (Panels C and D), we do not find
evidence that allows us to reject the null. Overall, these analyses provide
limited support for the opposition hypothesis.
Recall that the demography hypothesis stated that responsiveness to socio-
economic demand should be conditional on the ethnic composition of the
district. To test this hypothesis, we interact the socio-economic variables
with changes in the percentage of foreign-born district residents. We present
the marginal effects in Figure 6 and the full models in the supporting ma-
terial. As can be seen in the figure, and in line with the hypothesis, the
relationship between districts’ economy and legislators’ rhetoric is indeed
conditional on the ethnic composition of the district. Specifically, in cases
where the share of foreign-born residents diminishes or where the changes
are minimal, the relationship between economic hardships and rhetoric is
generally insignificant. However, all models indicate that in districts that
have experienced larger increases in the share of foreign-born inhabitants,
economic hardships have a significant impact on MPs’ responsiveness, such
that MPs talk in a more cultural difference oriented way.
We now focus on the relationship between ERP district electoral success,
and its relationship with responsiveness. However, since the selection of
speakers in parliament is not random, identification of this relationship is
challenging. Speaker selection is affected by factors such as government
agenda control, rules pertaining to debates, and party leadership allocation
of speeches across MPs (Proksch and Slapin, 2012). In addition, unobserved
factors can affect the probability of speaking, as well as MPs’ rhetoric. If
these factors are correlated, then traditional estimation techniques such as
ordinary least squares and binary dependent variable models, which do not
take into account the speech selection process, may yield biased and inconsis-
18We note that in the case of ∆ district economy, the confidence interval for opposition
and government overlap, while they do not in the case of ∆ welfare recipients. We do not
present a model interacting crime with government status, but the effect is insignificant
in that case as well.
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Figure 5: Marginal effect of district-level economy on rhetoric, conditional
on government membership
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Note: Symbols indicate point estimates. The solid lines are 90% confidence intervals.
tent results. In effect, we observe a truncated, and possibly unrepresentative
sample of positions via speeches, but are interested in learning about both
observed and potential positions (Vance and Ritter, 2014). To address these
issues, we utilize a sample selection model (Heckman, 1976).19 The sample
selection model jointly estimates the probability that a given MP will speak
in a given debate, as well as her expressed positions.
Our independent variable of interest is the change in the electoral success
19We use the R sampleSelection package.
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Figure 6: Marginal effect of district-level economy on rhetoric, conditional
on demography




































































































District demography and responsiveness
Note: Solid lines are marginal effect of economic change variables. Broken lines are 90% confi-
dence intervals. Histograms present the density of ∆ foreign born residents. Only the results of
the mixed models are presented. Fixed effects models provide similar results.
of the Sweden Democrats in MPs’ home districts. To reduce the possibility
that spatial correlations are driving the results, we also incorporate the
mean change in the election result of the Sweden Democrats in neighboring
districts. To isolate the district relationship, we include a variable that
measures the national level of change in the share of respondents who have
voted for a given party and state they would vote for it in the future. To
assuage concerns over unobserved confounders the models include parties
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and district fixed effects. Moreover, following Vance and Ritter (2014) and
in order to satisfy the exclusion restriction and ease the identification of
the model, we also include two variables that we believe to be predictive
of the selection process, but not of the expressed position of MPs, except
through the selection process. These are the rank of an MP in the party
list, and the number of years she has served in parliament. We limit our
sample only to the parliamentary sessions where the Sweden Democrats had
won representation, and to MPs who were members of parliament in these
sessions.20
Figure 7: Heckman Sample selection model estimates
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Note: Heckman Sample selection model outcome stage estimates along with 90% confidence
intervals.
We estimate both a 2-step Heckman model (a Heckit model) and a max-
imum likelihood version of the model. The latter assumes that the error
terms of the two stages are jointly normally distributed. If this assumption
is true, Wooldridge (2010) notes that maximum likelihood estimation will
20Including all MPs would bias our results. That is why we do not use selection models
to test the other hypotheses.
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be more efficient.21 Before reviewing the relationship between the ERP’s
electoral success and MPs positions, we note that both model specifications
have identified a significant positive correlation between the selection and
the speech stages (ρ =0.57 in the Heckit model and 0.42 in the maximum
likelihood model), indicating that the use of a sample selection model is
justified.
We present the main results of the sample selection model in Figure 7.
Most importantly, both models indicate that as the district-level success of
the ERP increases, mainstream MPs from the corresponding district shift
their position towards the cultural difference pole. Interestingly, the rela-
tionship between the country level success of the ERP and MPs’ rhetoric
is indistinguishable from zero. Finally, due to the shorter period utilized
in this model, it is unsurprising to find that the economic change variables
relationship with rhetoric is insignificant, but that the MP level variables
relationship with rhetoric is similar to that identified in previous models.
Conclusion
We have argued that district-level socio-economic decline indicates that
there is demand for cultural rhetoric on immigration, and have found that
MPs are responsive to this demand. We believe this finding to be helpful in
understanding the new discourses and political coalitions that are currently
being formed in Europe, as issue and identity politics are becoming more
salient. We have also found that this type of responsiveness is conditional
on demography; as more ‘foreigners’ inhabit economically deprived districts,
MPs feel more inclined to shift towards cultural discourse.
These processes are happening as the Swedish extreme right is gaining
ground. The analysis has identified a district-level relationship between its
electoral success and a shift toward cultural difference rhetoric. This result
is relevant to the debate as to whether ERPs matter. Mudde (2013) has
argued that the influence of ERPs on the issue of immigration is limited,
and that they are ‘catalysts rather than initiators.’ While there is no doubt-
ing that external circumstances, rather than the Sweden Democrats, have
led to the changes in the Swedish policy toward immigrants, this research
shows that the party has contributed to changing the mainstream discourse
21In the supporting material we present the full results, as well as separate OLS and
probit models.
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of immigration, and to ‘mainstreaming’ the cultural difference frame. More
generally, the analysis provides evidence that an electoral victory is not a
necessary condition for a important rhetorical changes. Rather, the mere
threat of the extreme-right can have a strong impact on the political dis-
course in European Democracies.
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